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Climate Change and Climate Politics 
Daniel Moran 
The essay that follows is based on the introduction to the forthcoming volume titled Climate 
Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis, edited by Daniel Moran (Georgetown 
University Press, 2011), and is reprinted with the permission of the publisher and copyright 
holder (www.press.georgetown.edu). The book in turn is based on the revised and expanded 
proceedings of a conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School in December 2007, and 
sponsored by the Long-Range Analysis Unit of the National Intelligence Council, to support the 
preparation of the National Intelligence Assessment on Climate Change presented to the United 
States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Select Committee 
on Energy Independence and Global Warming) in June 2008. 
* * * 
This book appraises the intermediate-term security risks that climate change may pose to the 
United States, its allies, and to regional and global order. It is intended to be a contribution to the 
growing literature on “environmental security,” a phrase that encompasses a wide range of policy 
problems. For many, environmental security is chiefly about addressing the challenges that 
climate change may present to humanity and its institutions. Security in this context is to be 
sought through measures designed to mitigate or adapt to changes in the earth’s ecology, which 
may some day make current social and economic practices unsustainable.[1] Others interpret 
climate change less as a direct threat than as an additional source of stress on the sinews of 
public life, which may cause fragile governments to fail, or provide new impetus for a range of 
violent outcomes, ranging from social upheaval to aggressive war.[2] 
The present work is of the latter kind. It does not seek to comment on the likelihood that the 
environmental changes foreseen by current earth science will come to pass; nor to evaluate 
policies that might be chosen in response to them. It is, instead, an attempt to lay the problems 
hypothesized by science on top of the known or anticipated challenges of international life, and 
consider what might change as a consequence. It seeks to do this in a relatively precise and 
disciplined way, however, and it is useful to begin by considering why, in the field of 
environmental security, precision and discipline can be hard to achieve. 
The greatest difficulty arises from the different speeds at which politics and the natural 
environment operate, or more precisely the rates at which they change. It must be admitted that 
the phrase “intermediate-term security risks” that was employed a few sentences ago to describe 
this project’s goals was chosen for no better reason than because it is equally unsatisfactory to 
scientists and statesmen alike. This volume originated in a project directly connected to real-
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world policy-making, and was intended to produce a result of practical value in that context. To 
that end all contributors were asked to evaluate the security implications of climate change out to 
the year 2030. In the world of politics, twenty years is not the intermediate term. It is a long time: 
the far horizon within which serious strategic planning has traditionally been done.[3] To policy-
makers and planners, risks that are a generation away are long-term risks. 
For earth scientists, on the other hand, twenty years is, if not quite the blink of an eye, then 
certainly a brief span of time, across which their models of our environmental future are barely 
able to generate useful results. The mainstream of credible work on climate change, as 
exemplified by the reports of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has 
tended in recent years to look further outward, toward 2050 or 2100, in presenting its 
conclusions.[4] Of necessity, models that are intended to anticipate conditions in fifty or a 
hundred years lose precision when asked to render judgments over significantly shorter (or 
longer) periods. 
If we imagine the models of the earth scientist as a kind of lens through the future may be 
viewed, then we must accept that, like real lenses, those models have an optimum focal range, on 
either side of which the image becomes progressively blurry. The same can be said of the 
assumptions, experiences, and predilections of policy-makers, which are the lenses by which 
they also seek to envision the future. The central challenge in the field of environmental security 
arises from the fact that these two sets of lenses have such different focal lengths that their useful 
fields of vision barely overlap. The timeframe of this study was chosen not because it is optimal 
in terms of either politics or science, but because it is at least credible in both contexts, and 
sufficiently so to impose a reasonable restraint on the range of conditions to be considered. 
Twenty years may be a long time in politics, but not so long as to be unimaginable. It may be a 
short time in the life of the earth, but not so short that the changes anticipated by current science 
will not have become subject to preliminary “out-of-sample” testing, which will in turn 
strengthen (or discount) the credibility of predictions about the longer-term future. 
In the same way that scientists and policy-makers diverge in their sense of how quickly time 
passes, so too do they differ with respect to the maps of the world they carry in their heads. The 
earth scientist’s map is drawn by natural forces on a planetary scale, which may be effected by 
human actions in aggregate, but which nevertheless operate without regard to human institutions. 
Its crucial boundaries are drawn by nature, in the form of sea coasts, mountain ranges, forests, 
deserts, glaciers, and so on. These things matter to the policy-maker too, of course, but their 
influence is often trumped by other lines, drawn by the hand of man, which divide one sovereign 
state from another. It is within those lines that the political choices that govern humanity’s 
response to climate change will be made. 
There is every reason to believe those choices will vary a good deal, even among polities 
confronted with substantially similar forms of environmental stress. This project appraises the 
security risks that climate change poses when its most readily anticipated effects are applied to 
the known political and social conditions of states whose fortunes are of particular importance to 
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the United States. The process of selection, it is worth emphasizing, was driven by concrete 
considerations of policy as judged by those tasked with making it, and not by social-scientific 
criteria aspiring to general theoretical validity. The resulting list—39 countries plus the European 
Union—could easily have been extended to almost any length. It also omits some countries 
whose policy relevance would appear to demand their inclusion. A number of places of intense 
current interest, including North Korea, Afghanistan, Iran, and the states of the Horn of Africa, 
have not been included because their politics are at present so opaque or unsettled that it did not 
seem possible to disentangle and evaluate the likely consequences of their exposure to climate 
change, however grave that exposure might be. Nevertheless, the resulting study is still the most 
comprehensive of its kind, and broadly representative of the security challenges that climate 
change may pose over the next few decades. 
All the research that follows takes as its starting point what might be described as “down the 
middle” assumptions about how anthropogenic climate change will unfold over the next few 
decades: i.e. that basic trends, both human and natural, will continue in their current directions 
and at their current pace. Climate science is all about building scenarios, and then modeling 
projected results across future time periods. Because this project considers a relatively short time 
period in environmental terms, albeit an extended one in political terms, it seemed most 
reasonable to employ scientific data based on models that assume the world economy will 
continue to develop more or less as it has recently: that the large-scale distribution of goods will 
continue to be governed by international markets; that market participants will continue to seek 
economic growth as a social good; and that no remarkable changes will occur in the consumption 
of fossil fuels, other that those that may arise as a consequence of rising costs in the marketplace. 
Other sets of assumptions are possible, and have often been explored by earth scientists by way 
of testing the range of outcomes their models may generate under varying patterns of human 
activity—increasing or decreasing economic growth, static or increasing efforts at environmental 
mitigation, and so on.[5] Because the focus of this project is on human activity itself, however, it 
was essential to hold the earth science constant, and also to avoid analyses predicated upon 
“worst-case scenarios”—or “best-case,” for that matter.  
The one area in which the “no-worst-case-scenarios” rule proved most difficult to enforce was 
with respect to rising sea level, a particularly contentious area of climate science. Many well-
founded early efforts to estimate sea level rise, including the work summarized by the IPCC, 
have been revealed as too conservative in light of subsequent experience, owing to the currently 
rapid melting of polar and glacial ice, whose pace has outstripped the scientific consensus.[6] 
Our data on sea level rise is pegged to low-elevation coastal zones of one and three meters, 
which, within our timeframe, imply a rate of sea level rise significantly faster than anything 
foreseen by the mainstream of climate scientists even a few years ago. On balance, and assuming 
the persistence of current conditions, a one-meter rise would lie at the far end of the range of 
what is currently thought possible by 2030.[7] A three-meter rise lies outside that range, and has 
been incorporated as a (relatively conservative) proxy for the kind of tidal surge that severe 
weather events like tropical cyclones routinely produce, and whose incidence is expected to 
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increase as a consequence of global warming.[8] The tidal surge produced by Hurricane Katrina, 
the most famous such episode in recent American history, exceeded seven meters.[9] 
Contributions to this volume are organized around six primary questions, which chapter authors 
were asked to address in whatever form seemed best to them. Here are the questions as originally 
posed: 
1. Your country or region may already be susceptible to unruly socio-political 
change due to existing traditional risk factors. Are the climate impacts hypothesized 
for 2030 likely to be an appreciable additional factor in triggering disruptive change, 
internally or externally? 
2. The most basic negative responses to environmental stress are either fight (civil 
conflict or external aggression) or flight (internal or external migration). For the 
people of your country or region, which response would you consider more likely? 
Please provide what detail you can with respect to the political parties, social or 
ethnic groups, or local areas where the actions you anticipate may be most serious or 
most likely to occur. 
3. Considering the disruptive possibilities you have described in response to the 
questions above, how would you assess the risk that the net result will be complete 
failure of the state? 
4. Conversely, might your country or region possess latent reserves of social 
resilience and ingenuity, or of institutional capital, which will allow it to meet the 
challenges of climate change successfully? Are there important social or other interest 
groups in your country or region that might benefit from climate change? or expect 
to? 
5. Would you anticipate that climate change might make your state an object of 
aggressive war to control scarce resources? Might it become a destination for 
migrants and refugees from neighboring countries? 
6. What do the behaviors and developments that you have foreseen in your state 
suggest about the outlook and tone of official foreign policy? Would you expect it to 
become more or less open to engagement with the larger world? More or less 
amendable to Western and American influence and interests? 
These are not quite the questions that scholars, left to themselves, would have formulated. They 
reflect the perennial need of policy-makers for firm, “actionable” answers to straight-forward 
questions, and as a consequence they may sometimes trample upon analytic nuances that are 
worth preserving in other contexts. It is apparent, for instance, that the choices available to a 
population confronted by climate stress go beyond “fight” or “flight.” The most likely choice is 
in fact adaptation in place; a possibility that is effectively acknowledged in the subsequent 
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question about ingenuity and social resourcefulness. Similarly, while it is possible that climate 
change may produce “winners” and “losers” within given societies, it is more likely to produce 
complex patterns of differential loss, thus increasing inequality while depressing economic 
performance and degrading social conditions for everyone.  
The governing assumption of this project has been that realistic arguments about environmental 
security must be conducted within a politically relevant time frame, and with reference to real 
states and the real societies they govern. Its outstanding inference, in turn, is that easy 
generalities about the security implications of climate change will be hard to come by. 
Nevertheless, there is one general point that is worth emphasizing: given the power of the natural 
forces that appear to be bearing down on mankind, it is easy to lose sight of human agency, and 
assume that all essential questions will eventually be decided by phenomena that dwarf all 
human endeavor. That may be true it in the long run. It certainly will be true if the worst 
anticipated effects of climate change come to pass. But it is not true during the period that 
concerns this book. Even when confronting the untrammeled forces of nature, humanity can 
expect to keep making its own history for a while longer yet. It will have to do its best. 
Without unduly anticipating the results of the studies that follow, a few comments may be useful 
by way of highlighting some the of larger patterns that emerge from considering the questions 
above across dozens of individual countries and regions. It is apparent, first of all, that the kinds 
of social and political actions that impact international security are almost invariably over-
determined, and most commonly arise from the intersection of multiple factors that may well 
seem manageable individually. Viewed in these terms climate change poses an especially 
insidious challenge, combining as it does the gradual accumulation of relatively subtle effects, 
and an increasing tendency toward dramatic events (flooding, drought, storms, and so on) that 
are liable to galvanize public opinion at unexpected moments. Even the best governments have 
every reason to hate problems of this kind, and they are likely to prove especially troublesome to 
authoritarian regimes whose institutions have been optimized (if that is the word) to deal with 
more traditional forms of opposition and instability. In this respect it may be easy to 
underestimate the threat that climate change poses to the well-ordered police states of the 
developing world, whose true social base does not extend much beyond the armed forces and 
rent-seeking economic elites. 
On balance it is clear that, for much of the world, the most important sources of resilience to 
climate change reside within societies rather than within governments; and also that many 
governments may prove reluctant to take the kinds of measures required to tap into that 
resilience and mobilize social capacity. It is in this area that the intersection between climate 
change and local conditions becomes especially complex, and where general statements about 
how things can go wrong at the macro level are of least value. It is of little use, for instance, to be 
told that “by 2020 between 75 million and 250 million [Africans] are projected to be exposed to 
increased water stress due to climate change,”[10] unless one also knows which Africans 
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The evidence presented here offers little reason to anticipate significant international violence as 
an immediate consequence of climate change and associated resource scarcities. Rather, 
problems of this kind seem more likely to arise as second-order effects brought about by climate-
induced demographic shifts, which may inspire violent reactions depending on the social groups 
involved and the prevailing attitudes in play. Climate change will tend to increase inequality 
across a wide range of societies, even if it does not produce many outright “winners” anywhere. 
It is especially likely to heighten strains between urban and rural populations, a crucial social 
fault line throughout the developing world. And here one specific inference may be worth 
highlighting, which is that, for the foreseeable future, the critical path connecting climate change 
to social and political failure lies less through rising temperatures or rising sea-levels than 
through changing distributions of fresh water. If there is one piece of advice that this study 
would appear to recommend to policy-makers and strategic planners everywhere, it would have 
to be “follow the water.” 
As to the ultimate question of how climate change may impact relations between the countries 
studied here and the United States, the picture is mixed. In the developing world there is little 
doubt that adaptation to climate change will outweigh the mitigation of carbon emissions as a 
policy priority; and that in the pursuit of effective adaptation Western technological expertise 
and financial assistance will be essential. In this respect climate change may provide a 
framework of common interests that, if faced squarely and honestly, might bring North and 
South closer together. Yet it is also likely that, as public consciousness of climate change and its 
perils expands, so too will an awareness that historical responsibility for those perils lies 
disproportionately at the feet of a few states. Some of those states are among the greatest 
beneficiaries of the exploitative economic and colonial practices of the past. Others are among 
the chief victims of those same practices. The largest producer of greenhouse gases today, as is 
well known, is China. It is less well known that Indonesia is now on the verge of outstripping the 
entirety of the EU as a carbon emitter. India and Russia also rank high in this regard, and appear 
destined to rise; though neither they nor anyone else is likely to surpass the United States on a 
per capita basis anytime soon.  
This last metric may well prove to be the one that makes the most emotional sense to the average 
citizens of the developing world. They now find themselves subject to unexpected scrutiny on 
account of environmental practices no different than those adopted by advanced societies during 
their own rise to material prosperity. There is no question that such perceptions will play their 
part in determining whether climate change proves to be a new source of strife, or a new means 
of reminding mankind that we really are all in this together. This volume is intended as a 
contribution to security studies, not to moral philosophy. Yet it is safe to say that, in managing 
the security consequences of climate change, it will not be possible to leave questions of justice 
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1. For a representative selection of recent scholarship in this vein, see the papers presented at the 
workshop on Human Security and Climate Change (Oslo, 21–23 June 2005), collectively 
available at http://www.gechs.org/2005/06/24/holmen_workshop/. It goes without saying that 
traditional concepts of national and international security, and newer ones of human and 
environmental security, are not mutually exclusive. See for instance Jon Barnett and W. Neil 
Adger, “Climate Change, Human Security, and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography 26, no. 6 
(August 2007): 639-55. Sharon Burke and Christine Parthemore, eds. A Strategy for American 
Power: Energy, Climate, and National Security, Center for New American Security Solarium 
Strategy Series (June 2008), is an interesting example of how the rhetorical strategies of Cold 
War security studies can be adapted to the challenges of reducing dependence on fossil fuels and 
cutting greenhouse gas emissions. 
2. Climate change was first injected into the mainstream literature of security in the 1990s as a 
consequence of a number of challenging works hypothesizing that, in the wake of the Cold 
War’s unwinding, casus belli should henceforth be expected mainly from competition over 
resources, which climate change would exacerbate. See, for instance, Thomas Homer-Dixon, 
Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and 
Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2001).  More recent work has tended to back away from such neo-
Malthusian scenarios, primarily because it has proven difficult to specify the nature of the causal 
links required to connect environmental stress and international violence. Yet it remains apparent 
that such linkages are possible and even likely in given circumstances. See for instance Idean 
Salehyan, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet,” Journal of Peace Research 
45, no. 3 (2008), 315-26; Halvard Buhaug, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ole Magnus Theisen, 
“Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict,” presented at the World Bank Workshop 
on The Social Dimensions of Climate Change (Washington, DC, 5-6 March 2008), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDCCWor
kingPaper_Conflict.pdf.; and the articles assembled by Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch in Political Geography 26, no. 6, Special Issue on Climate Change and Conflict 
(August 2007): 627-735. Nordås and Gleditsch begin their volume with a useful survey of the 
evolution of the literature on environmental security (627–38), which may be compared to an 
earlier one by Gleditsch (“Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” 
Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 [1998]: 381-400); and a more recent one by Geoffrey D. 
Dabelko, “Planning for Climate Change: The Security Community’s Precautionary Principle,” 
Climate Change 96 (2009): 13-21, http://www.springerlink.com/content/gn2h652887023576. 
3. The current top-line statement of American military doctrine, for instance, is Joint Vision 
2020, which appeared in May 2000, 
www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/joint_vision_2020.pdf. It 
will eventually be succeed by a new statement called Joint Vision 2030, which is under 
development now. See also the series of long-range planning documents created by the National 
Intelligence Council: Global Trends 2010 (1997); Global Trends 2015 (2000); Mapping the 
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Global Future 2020 (2004), and the current statement, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed 
World (http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf), which 
appeared in 2008; also NATO’s “Multiple Futures Project: Trends and Challenges in Global 
Security to 2030,” http://www.act.nato.int/multiplefutures/ACT-
RUSI%20Roundtable%20Report.pdf. 
4. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. M. L. Parry et al., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). See also Nick Mabey, Delivering Climate Security: International 
Security Responses to a Climate Changed World, Royal United Services Institute Whitehall 
Paper 69 (London: Routledge, 2008). 
5. An influential set of alternative future scenarios for use in this context were presented in the 
IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (2000), 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/?src=/climate/ipcc/emission/, which sought to 
envision future conditions varying with relation to economic practices, regional and global 
integration, and increasing or static emphasis of environmental remediation. Within the IPCC 
framework the assumptions of this project are consistent with scenario A1B, the one most 
frequently discussed in subsequent IPCC reports. Scenario A1B hypothesizes that economic and 
demographic trends will continue along current lines, and that energy consumption will remain 
balanced among multiple sources, rather than shifting decisively away from fossil fuels. An 
example of a study that seeks to consider global security across a range of climate scenarios—
roughly the mirror image of the present project’s structure—is Kurt M. Campbell et al., The Age 
of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate 
Change, Center for Strategic and International Studies (November 2007), 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf. 
6. See for instance Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Craig Meisner, David Wheeler, and 
Jianping Yan, “The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A Comparative 
Analysis,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4136 (February 2007), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/02/09/000016406_2007
0209161430/Rendered/PDF/wps4136.pdf; James Hansen, “Huge sea level rises are coming—
unless we act now,” NewScientist Environment, 25 July 2007, 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19526141.600; Alun Anderson, “The Great Melt: The 
Coming Transformation of the Arctic,” World Policy Journal 26, no. 4 (December 2009); 53–65; 
and Orville Schell, “The Message from the Glaciers,” New York Review of Books 57, no. 9 (27 
May 2010): 46–50. The melting of Arctic sea ice will not contribute to sea level rise, though it is 
symptomatic of the same environmental trends. It has lately emerged as a security issue in its 
own right, because of the opportunities for resource competition and other forms of national 
rivalry that it may incite. See Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and 
Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March-April 2008): 65-68; 
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and Klaus Dodds, “The Arctic: From Frozen Desert to Open Polar Sea?” in Maritime Strategy 
and Global Order, ed. Daniel Moran and James A. Russell (Georgetown University Press, 
forthcoming). 
7. A 1-meter LECZ is the lowest level at which effects upon population can be calculated with 
any precision. This is owed in part to significant discrepancies between relevant geographic and 
demographic data. See Marc Levy et al., Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Select US 
Security Interests, Center for International Earth Science Information Network Working Paper 
(Columbia University, July 2008). 
8. On the significance of extreme weather events as an aspect of environmental security see 
Joshua W. Busy, Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action,  Council on 
Foreign Relations Special Report 23 (November 2007); idem., “Who Cares about the Weather: 
Climate Change and U.S. National Security,” Security Studies 17 (2008): 468-504; and Sven 
Harmeling, Global Climate Risk Index 2010: Who is Most Vulnerable? Weather-Related Loss 
Events Since 1990 and How Copenhagen Needs to Respond, Germanwatch Briefing Paper 
(December 2009), http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/cri2010.pdf. 
9. Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: 
Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005 [updated 10 August 2006], National Hurricane Center, 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
10. IPCC WGII, Climate Change 2007, 13. 
